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Foreword
Building Bridges over Troubled Waters:
Eco-pragmatism and the Environmental
Prospect
Daniel A. Farber
t
"[Tihe work which is likely to be our most durable monument.., is a
work of bare utility; not a shrine, not a fortress, not a palace, but a
bridge."
Montgomery Schuyler'
INTRODUCTION
Besides bringing to mind a popular song, the title of this
Essay is intended to evoke a somewhat complex image of the
task facing today's pragmatic ecologists. "Building bridges"
suggests most immediately a desire to occupy the space
between two extremes. This is clearly an important part of
Eco-pragmatism. 2 Yet, as the title is intended to suggest, there
t McKnight Presidential Professor of Public Law and Henry J. Fletcher
Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School; Sho Sato Professor of
Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law (Boalt Hall). An earlier
version of this Essay was delivered as the keynote address at the Symposium
on The Pragmatic Ecologist: Environmental Protection as a Jurisdynamic
Experience. The Symposium was held on November 1 and 2, 2002, and was
sponsored by the University of Minnesota Law School and the Consortium on
Law and Values in Health, Environment & the Life Sciences. As the putative
honoree, I would particularly like to thank Tom Sullivan, Alex Johnson, and
Susan Wolf, without whose support the conference would not have succeeded,
and Jim Chen, whose initiative and efforts made the conference possible.
1. The Bridge as a Monument, 37 HARPER'S WKLY. 321, 326 (1883),
quoted in the frontispiece of DAVID MCCULLOUGH, THE GREAT BRIDGE: THE
EPIC STORY OF THE BUILDING OF THE BROOKLYN BRIDGE (1972).
2. See J.B. Ruhl, A Manifesto for the Radical Middle, 38 IDAHO L. REV.
385, 387 (2002). Ruhl also discusses the need for the Center to embrace an
affirmative program of its own rather than merely compromising between
extremes. Id. at 407. A useful introduction to the pragmatic approach can be
found in Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-
Reformation: Restoring Faith in Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV.
689, 737-48 (2000).
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is more to the picture. Building a bridge is different from
merely compromising by standing in the middle of the stream.
A bridge must have its own strength and structure; it must
(literally) stand for something. But an even more important
part of the image relates to the troubled waters.
Environmental issues involve powerful, turbulent, and
unpredictable forces that can easily rush us to disaster.
Building a bridge in such circumstances is an inherently risky
venture. Thus, I mean to stress not just the need for bridge
building, but the potential hazards of the venture. In such a
venture, excessive pessimism can be paralyzing, but blithe
optimism can be fatal.
Pragmatists are often accused of a facile optimism. 3 Like
Gatsby, it is said, they believe "'in the green light, the orgiastic
future that year by year recedes before us'-a future that
eluded us in the past, 'but that's no matter-tomorrow we will
run faster, stretch out our arms farther.' 4 In this, if in nothing
else, environmental scholars seem almost universally
"pragmatic,"5 for references to pessimism are few and far
between in legal scholarship about the environment. 6
Blind optimism, however, is not what pragmatism stands
for. Nor is such an attitude a sound foundation for
environmental efforts (or for bridge construction, for that
matter). Rather, eco-pragmatism must be based on a realistic
understanding of our current situation and future prospects-
one that fully acknowledges our difficulties without being
paralyzed by despair. 7 In short, eco-pragmatism must confront
3. For a sample of such comments, see JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, THE
PROMISE OF PRAGMATISM: MODERNISM AND THE CRISIS OF KNOWLEDGE AND
AUTHORITY 20, 285-86, 367-68, 404 (1994).
4. Id. at 20 (quoting F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 182
(1995)).
5. Some exceptions are discussed in Part II.
6. This is confirmed by a Westlaw search of law reviews and law journals
for "pessimism" within the same sentence as "environmental."
7. See DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM 206 (1999).
To cope with environmental challenges, we will need a society that is
attached to environmental norms, willing to take a long-term
perspective, and institutionally capable of wise decisions. This ideal
sometimes seems far removed from reality. It is easy to be cynical
about politics. But we have made considerable progress in addressing
environmental problems. Although being pragmatic means being
realistic, it does not mean abandoning our hopes for the future.
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and overcome the case for eco-pessimism. 8 Only then can it
escape the accusation of being an "anxious-to-please kind of
pragmatism, without much room for strong feelings" or an
"excuse for watered-down and muddled substance."9
This Essay takes on the challenge of eco-pessimism. My
concern is not with the worst-case scenarios: the possibilities
that it is already too late to save the environment or that the
scientific and technical problems will prove insoluble. These
possibilities cannot be disproved definitively. Yet we have no
real reason to believe them to be true, and, in any event, they
are beyond any possible human control. If our condition is
incurable, so be it. Yet what is more discouraging is the
possibility that solutions are available but that we lack the
political will or institutional means to implement them. It is
this political form of eco-pessimism that I will address.
The first part of this Essay considers the arguments for
eco-pessimism. It is disturbingly easy to make the case that
human institutions are incapable of successfully solving
environmental problems. Besides the inherent difficulties
posed by the problems themselves, implementing solutions
requires that we overcome deep-seated human weaknesses:
grave collective action problems, the limitations of human
rationality, and a necessarily imperfect political system. These
are formidable challenges. Certainly, there is no guarantee
that they will be overcome.
As Part II of this Essay shows, however, these difficulties
are not insurmountable. Environmental law has had some
significant successes, and creative new solutions continue to
bubble up. Despite the defects of the political process and the
discouraging setbacks, democracy does better in reality than
one might expect in theory. It would be foolish to assume that
policy victories are assured, but equally foolish to assume that
defeat is inevitable. In light of the difficulties, the successes
achieved to date are remarkable.
The concluding part of this Essay considers how eco-
pragmatists can contribute to the success of environmental
protection. Part of the work of eco-pragmatism is reactive:
exploring how current legal rules and doctrine can be brought
more into line with a pragmatic environmentalism, and
8. The term "eco-pessimism" was suggested to me in conversation by
Jamie Grodsky.
9. Lisa Heinzerling, Pragmatists and Environmentalists, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1421, 1426-27 (2000).
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defending pragmatism against fundamentalists of the Right
and the Left. In the short run, these may be the most
important contributions that eco-pragmatists can make. But in
the long run, eco-pragmatists need to create new
understandings of our environmental goals and help design
novel institutions to meet the distinctive challenges of
environmental protection. As legal scholars, eco-pragmatists
cannot single-handedly solve environmental problems; often,
their direct contribution will be small. What they can do is
foster a legal context in which solutions become possible.
I. THE CASE FOR ECO-PESSIMISM
Although the tone of environmental scholarship is
predominantly upbeat, it is not hard to find pessimistic
opinions about the capacity of our institutions to deal with
environmental problems. Consider the following:
* From a leading American economist, "Some of my
friends are in despair. They fear that by the time the
political pendulum swings, the damage will be
irreparable.... And most important of all,
environmental neglect will have gone past the point of
no return."10
" A business school professor who specializes in
environmental regulation, "'[Tihere is room for
optimism when you look on a firm-by-firm, facility-by-
facility basis. But when it comes to fighting
legislative fights I'm not optimistic."'"I
* An environmental litigator at the same conference, "'I
tend to be optimistic by nature, but the recent past
hasdiscouraged me in this arena."' Also, "'[T]he fact
that Republicans and industry aligned to resuscitate
Lochner-era jurisprudence, and rip out the heart of
the [Climate Change Agreements] before the U.S.
Supreme Court, doesn't exactly instill trust either.' '1 2
" From an environmental law professor, "Tremendous
efforts have been made to rectify environmental
10. Paul Krugman, Into the Wilderness, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2002, at A33.
11. Joel A. Mintz, Whither Environmental Reform?: Some Thoughts on a
Recent AALS Debate, 31 ENVTL. L. REV. 10,719, 10,722 (2001) (quoting David
B. Spense, University of Texas at Austin, McCumbs School of Business).
12. Id. at 10,722 (quoting John Walke, Attorney, Natural Resources
Defense Council).
[Vol 87:851
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degradation, and a succession of newly recognized
problems has been tackled. Nonetheless, many of the
original problems remain unsolved, and the
fundamental causes of our environmental plight
remain largely as they were at the outset.' 13
* From the same author, "The tasks before us are so
complex and our comprehension of them so
fundamentally limited that even as we work at them
and perceive that we are making progress, at the
same time we just as readily conclude that we are
getting nowhere." 14
These are scattered sentiments from a variety of sources.
Virtually everyone who works in environmental law must have
had such thoughts in moments of discouragement.
The fact is that there are serious grounds for questioning
whether our political system is capable of handling
environmental issues effectively. To begin with, it has long
been a clich6 that environmental regulation operates on the
frontier of science, meaning that scientific uncertainty is
endemic. 15 This not only makes it more difficult to identify the
correct solutions of environmental problems, but also makes it
more difficult to arrive at political consensus. Furthermore,
even completely rational individuals with full information
would find it difficult to mobilize in order to implement
solutions, due to collective action problems. And the political
universe is hardly made up of completely rational individuals
with full information. Instead, it features inadequately
informed and imperfectly analytical voters, clashing ideologues,
and greedy special interests.
These are not merely unfounded laments; as we will see,
they are backed up by serious research in economics, political
science, and cognitive psychology. In short, the argument for
political eco-pessimism is all too easy to make.
A. THE INHERENT DIFFICULTY OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
In a book published ten years ago, Chris Stone cogently
described the high level of scientific uncertainty about
environmental problems:
13. Kenneth A. Manaster, Ten Paradoxes of Environmental Law, 27 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 917, 917 (1994).
14. Id. at 919 (footnote omitted).
15. See FARBER, supra note 7, at 165-68, 176-78.
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We are only beginning to learn how the world works. Our ignorance
is not only about the dynamics of globe-spanning climate and current.
Scientists have only started to inventory the world's forests and
monitor the thickness of the ice caps .... As for biodiversity, we do
not know how many species there are to imperil.
16
Stone made a particular effort to investigate the state of
scientific knowledge regarding global climate change. 17 What
he and his research assistant found was that "[t]he deeper into
the better authorities we fished, the vague and more qualified
the projections we found."' 8
Stone's observations remain generally valid today.
Consider the two topics he mentioned: biodiversity and climate
change. 19 We are still unsure of the number of species in
peril. 20 For example, although the "most commonly cited figure
for the fraction of the global flora threatened with extinction" is
thirteen percent, another recent estimate is that "as many as
half of the world's plant species may qualify as threatened with
extinction."21  Similarly, despite much scientific progress,
predictions regarding global climate change are still shrouded
in uncertainty.22 Because of this uncertainty, the International
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) decided not to include
probability estimates in its Third Assessment Report (TAR):
It was the unanimous view of the TAR lead authors that no method of
assigning probabilities to a 100-year-climate forecast is sufficiently
widely accepted and documented in the refereed literature to pass the
extensive IPCC review process. Three reasons stand out: the
difficulty of assigning reliable probabilities to socioeconomic trends
(and hence emissions) in the latter half of the 21st century, the
difficulty of obtaining consensus ranges for quantities like climate
sensitivity, and the possibility of a nonlinear response in the carbon
cycle or ocean circulation to very high late-21st-century greenhouse
gas concentrations.
23
An even more recent discussion of one piece of the problem
concludes that "[tihough satisfactory understanding of...
variability of Arctic climate remains elusive, substantial
16. CHRISTOPHER STONE, THE GNAT Is OLDER THAN MAN: GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN AGENDA 24 (1993).
17. Id. at 13-16, 20-23.
18. Id. at xvi-vii.
19. See id. at 9, 13-16.
20. See id. at 18.
21. Nigel C.A. Pitman & Peter M. Jergensen, Estimating the Size of the
World's Threatened Flora, 298 SCIENCE 989 (2002).
22. John Reilly et al., Uncertainty and Climate Change Assessments, 293
SCIENCE 430, 430 (2002).
23. Id.
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progress has been made in the past five years or so .... -"24 The
article observes that current models fit the data poorly and
"tend to produce a tremendous spread in their predicted future
warming in the Arctic."25
Part of the problem is simply that we are in the early
stages of scientific investigation, but another part is that so
many environmental issues involve complex dynamic systems
with nonlinear properties. For example, instead of the familiar
"balance of nature," ecologists currently tend to view the
biosphere as characterized by complicated, chaotic interactions
in which any equilibrium is purely temporary.26
Even when we have successfully diagnosed a problem,
uncertainties also attend any attempted remedy. For instance,
as Jim Chen explains,
Overfishing has destroyed the commercial viability of at least half of
the world's fish stocks. In the United States, some 45 percent of fish
stocks are overfished; the populations of some species have fallen
below 10 percent of optimum levels. Our inability to ascertain safe
harvest levels for even intensely studied fish stocks undermines our
confidence in the evidently illusory notion of "sustainable" fishing.27
Similarly, while rightly applauding the goal of ecological
restoration, A. Dan Tarlock's contribution to this Symposium
emphasizes the tremendous scientific challenges to successful
restoration programs: "We now know that managing nature to
achieve environmental benefits is much more complex than
initially imagined. Ecology has made its application even
harder by substituting a dynamic for static view of nature and
deconstructing all concepts from ecosystem to species."28
24. Richard E. Moritz et al., Dynamics of Recent Climate Change in the
Arctic, 297 SCIENCE 1497, 1497 (2002).
25. Id. at 1501.
26. For an excellent summary of the recent literature, see Fred
Bosselman, What Lawmakers Can Learn from Large-Scale Ecology, 17 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 207, 225 (2002). Some of the implications for
environmental regulation are surveyed in J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of
Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the
Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933
(1997). Recent research on large-scale networks also reveals the emergence of
unexpected properties that may make control difficult. See Ian Foster,
Unexpected Consequences of Connections, 297 SCIENCE 1124 (2002). For an
accessible introduction to the subject, including a discussion of implications for
ecology, see MARK BUCHANAN, NEXUS: SMALL WORLDS AND THE
GROUNDBREAKING SCIENCE OF NETWORKS 138-55 (2002).
27. Jim Chen, Globalization and Its Losers, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
157, 189 (2000) (citations omitted).
28. A. Dan Tarlock, Slouching Toward Eden: The Eco-pragmatic
2003]
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Such uncertainties raise obvious difficulties for policy
analysts, but those analytical difficulties do have possible
solutions. 29 What is more worrisome is the political problem
created by uncertainty. As discussed below, humans are not
particularly good at processing information about
uncertainty.30 Uncertainty sometimes becomes a source of
panic, but can equally become an excuse for ignoring a looming
problem. For example, in rejecting the Kyoto Protocol,
President Bush emphasized that "'no one can say with any
certainty what constitutes a dangerous level of warming, and
therefore what level must be avoided.' 31 As this statement
indicates, uncertainty provides political actors with an inviting
pretext for inaction.32 While Bush's assertion was literally
true, it also carried the inaccurate implication that we can
safely ignore the potential consequences of global warming. 33
In reality, useful benchmarks can be identified, such as the
melting of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet or (more seriously) the
disruption of large-scale oceanic circulation, and we do have
some basis for estimating the relevant temperature ranges. 34
Failure to stabilize emissions now does not ineluctably lead to
catastrophic outcomes, but may seriously limit our future
options as new information develops. 35 It is, however, easier to
close our eyes and hope that the problem will go away, than to
invest substantial resources without a guaranteed payoff.
In the past, we have successfully dealt with similar
uncertainties by waiting until the scientific evidence clarified
Challenges of Ecosystem Revival, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1182 (2003).
29. See FARBER, supra note 7, at 168-90.
30. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
31. Brian C. O'Neill & Michael Oppenheimer, Dangerous Climate Impacts
and the Kyoto Protocol, 296 SCIENCE 1971, 1991 (2002) (quoting President
George W. Bush, Jan. 11, 2001).
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 1971-72.
35. Id. at 1972. According to O'Neill and Oppenheimer,
Stabilizing [carbon dioxide] concentrations near 450 ppm would likely
preserve the option of avoiding shutdown of the [oceanic circulation
system] and may also forestall the disintegration of the [West
Antarctic ice sheet], although it appears to be inadequate for
preventing severe damage to at least one unique ecosystem [coral
reefs]. Taking into account uncertainties in the working of the carbon
cycle, the cumulative Kyoto target is consistent with this goal.
Delaying reductions by industrial countries beyond 2010 risks
foreclosing the 450 ppm option.
858 [Vol 87:851
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or until an easily visible disastrous event took place.36 Jim
Krier has pointed out that this strategy, which he calls
"exfoliation," has worked adequately for some environmental
problems such as urban smog, but it is less suited for some
current environmental issues. 37 After recounting some of the
ongoing scientific disputes, he discusses the implications for
problems such as global climate change:
"Where," asks the New York Times, "does all this leave the debate?" I
worry that it leaves it up in the air (no pun), where it will remain
until some climactic event brings the problem to earth. As with
Southern California's air pollution problem some fifty years earlier, it
appears now, in the case of global warming, that speculation is not
providing sufficient salience to move policy along. This in turn
implies that global-warming policy might instead have to develop
through a process of exfoliation.
The trouble is that that process does not seem to fit this problem.
It did fit the other problems I have discussed-pollution and fires in
southern California, tourist muggings in Florida-primarily because
those were local problems .... But will this be true as well of global
warming and ozone depletion and toxic chemicals and the destruction
of ocean fisheries and tropical rain forests? 38
Krier may have been too pessimistic about our institutional
capacity to confront uncertainty, but he was undoubtedly right
about the challenges posed by uncertainty to traditional
methods of decision making. Uncertainty can only serve to
exacerbate the inherent institutional difficulty posed by
environmental law.
B. THE COLLECTiVE ACTION PROBLEM
It is tempting to ascribe the frustrations of environmental
politics to human frailty. If only people were totally rational,
well informed, and committed to environmental progress, then
the difficulties would dissolve. Or so we would like to think.
But the actuality is that even under these unattainable ideal
circumstances, environmental protection might not take place.
The basic collective action problem is described by Buzz
Thompson:
Anyone who has studied the environment for very long understands
the tragedy of the commons. When a resource is freely available to
everyone in common, everyone has an incentive to take as much of
that resource as they want, even though the collective result may be
36. See James E. Krier, The End of the World News, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
851, 852-55 (discussing the pattern of air pollution in Southern California).
37. Id. at 855, 858-60.
38. Id. at 859-60 (footnote omitted).
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the destruction of the resource itself. Society as a whole would be
better off restraining consumption and preserving the resource. But
the rational action for each individual is to consume to her heart's
content.... The cumulative result of reasonable individual choices is
collective disaster.39
As Thompson points out, several solutions to the tragedy of
the commons exist in principle.40 First, the commons may be
privatized, so that each user has the exclusive right to use (and
a corresponding interest in preserving) a portion of the
commons. 41 Second, control over the commons can be given to a
single manager, who can share the proceeds among the
community. 42 Third, where the first two solutions are not
practical, the government or the community can place limits on
individual use to prevent damage to the commons. 43
Unfortunately, Thompson concludes that despite the existence
of these solutions, "governments and other institutions have
found it extremely difficult to address many of the most
important commons dilemmas facing the world today."44 Two
of his examples are depletion of world fisheries and exhaustion
of groundwater supplies.45  Of particular interest is the
example of global climate change, where Thompson concludes
that "[finding a formula for reducing and capping emissions
that is acceptable to all nations is proving to be a Herculean
task."46
In part, the difficulty of solving commons problems is due
to a factor that we have already discussed: "[W]hen there is
scientific uncertainty, people faced with a tough solution to a
commons dilemma engage in tremendous wishful thinking."47
But there are other factors as well.4 8 Solving the problem of
the commons would often require cutbacks in individual use,
leading to a sense that entitlements would be unfairly
invaded. 49 Furthermore, individuals may be unwilling to
39. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to
Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 242 (2000).
40. Id. at 243.
41. Id. at 243-44.
42. Id. at 244.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 246-53.
46. Id. at 255.
47. Id. at 258.
48. Id. at 256-65.
49. Id. at 256-57.
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sacrifice the immediate gains from overuse to preserve
resources for the future.50 Ironically, one of the major problems
is that people "tend to be optimists about the future, at least
when taking precautionary steps today is costly."51
C. POLITICAL DYSFUNCTION
Some of the barriers to implementing environmental
solutions derive from the political process. The first type of
barrier involves the limited ability of voters to process
information about environmental issues. The second type
involves the limited willingness of individuals to make concrete
sacrifices for environmental progress despite their principles.
The third type involves distortions in public discourse and in
the legislative process.
A voluminous body of psychological studies documents the
shortcomings of human rationality.52  Among the most
prominent shortcomings are the following. In general, people
are too optimistic when faced with uncertainty, assuming that
they will escape the risks. 53 They also suffer from hindsight
bias, overestimating the likelihood of events that have already
taken place and thus the likelihood of repetition.54 As a related
matter, they often overemphasize recent or dramatic
information. 55 They also tend to become attached to the status
quo, worrying more about what they might lose from a change
than what they might gain. 56
A recent article by Jeff Rachlinski examined the
implications of these findings for global climate change.5 7
Briefly, he found that
50. Id. at 256, 262-65.
51. Id. at 263.
52. See Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 279, 282 (2001).
53. Id. at 283.
54. Id. at 284.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 286. For fuller introductions to the subject, see JONATHAN
BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING (2d ed. 1994); JUDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER (Terry Connolly et al. eds., 2d. ed.
2000). The seminal article connecting these findings to issues in
environmental regulation was Roger Noll & James E. Krier, Some
Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD.
747 (1990).
57. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 299.
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[s]everal psychological phenomena of judgment . . . support a more
pessimistic prediction of humanity's ability to respond effectively to
the threat of global climate change. First, because the scientific
community lacks a consensus on the degree of climate change that the
planet will experience, society is unlikely to achieve a consensus on
the need to undertake costly preventive measures. In other cases of
scientific uncertainty, people often adopt extreme positions and
adhere to them closely, thereby impeding societal consensus. Second,
even if a consensus emerges ... other psychological phenomena
suggest that people will still be unwilling to undertake such solutions.
People become attached to their current level of prosperity, . . . which
makes any solution that requires significant cutbacks in the economic
status quo unacceptable. 5
8
Somewhat prophetically, Rachlinski concluded that these
"psychological problems make an international treaty [on
climate change] extremely unlikely."59
As Rachlinski indicated, one effect of uncertainty is to
increase polarization, as people find support in the conflicting
scientific evidence for their own positions. Douglas A. Kysar
and James Salzman's contribution to this Symposium
emphasizes the extent of this polarization. 60 Moreover, as
Chris Schroeder demonstrates, the division between "prophets"
(environmental purists) and "priests" (devotees of cost-benefit
analysis), also perpetuates itself in part based on the
propensity of people with different biases to give different
interpretations to the same data.61 But the priest/prophet
dichotomy actually understates the extent of the division. The
spectrum extends beyond the priests to the "counter-
reformationists" who are less interested in trade-offs between
costs and benefits than in using the Constitution to eviscerate
environmental regulation.62
Quite apart from these disputes over principle are those
whose motivation is more mundane. Public choice theory
58. Id. at 303 (footnote omitted). Rachlinski did suggest, however, that
people's attention might be captured by dramatic weather episodes, leading
climate change to become a salient issue. Id. at 313. Of course, it is also
possible that people will overreact to small risks because of errors in
processing probability information, leading to excessive investment in risk
avoidance. Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and
Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 84 (2002).
59. Rachlinski, supra note 57, at 303.
60. See Douglas A. Kysar & James Salzman, Environmental Tribalism, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1099, 1101-02 (2003).
61. Christopher H. Schroeder, Prophets, Priests, and Pragmatists, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1065, 1091-92 (2003).
62. See Michael J. Gerhardt, On Revolution and Wetland Regulations, 90
GEO. L.J. 2143, 2143-46, 2173 (2002).
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teaches us that special interest groups are likely to have
disproportionate power in the political process. 63 The reason is
that the difficulty of mobilizing a group is inversely
proportional to its size.64 It is easier to contact and organize a
smaller group than a larger one. 65  Moreover, political
organization presents something like a "commons" problem,
because each member of an affected group would prefer to gain
the benefits of political action without incurring the costs, just
as each shepherd would prefer to get the benefits of better
pasture without limiting the grazing of his own sheep.66 This
problem is less acute with members of a small group, because
their proportionately higher individual stakes make it
worthwhile for them to invest in monitoring each other and
also make them more sensitive to the risk that the venture will
fail without their cooperation. Thus, industry groups are easier
to organize than the public at large, even if both groups have
equal stakes in the outcome. A corollary is that special
interests are likely to have a large impact on our ability to
enact environmental legislation. 67
Ordinary individuals, too, may have trouble putting long-
term social goals ahead of their immediate self-interest, even if
they themselves endorse the social goals. For example,
although large majorities of the American people endorse
recycling programs, only those with the strongest
environmental attitudes recycle when doing so is
inconvenient. 68  Increasing participation in recycling by
persuasion turns out to be much less successful than simply
making it more convenient. 69 In general, surveys show that
"the public may be willing to have more societal resources
devoted to the environment only if it will not require
substantial personal sacrifice."70 For example, in dealing with
global warming, people are much more willing to accept
63. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 1-21 (1991).
64. Id. at 23.
65. Id.
66. See id. (describing the "free rider" problem).
67. See NEIL CARTER, THE POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: IDEAS,
ACTIVISM, POLICY 170-73 (2001).
68. See Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1281-84
(2001).
69. Id. at 1296.
70. Richard J. Bord et al., Is Accurate Understanding of Global Warming
Necessary to Promote Willingness to Sacrifice, 8 RISK 339, 343 (1997).
2003]
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measures that regulate or tax industry as opposed to
themselves.71
Zygmunt Plater's account of the Tellico Dam
controversy72-the dispute that led to the Court's famous
opinion protecting endangered species in TVA v. Hill73-
illustrates the power of narrow self-interest to overcome the
combined efforts of environmentalists and economists. A report
by the General Accounting Office (GAO) revealed that the
purported justifications for the dam "do not give a truly valid
picture," and further called the justifications used by the
project's advocates "statistically weak" and "inflated."74 The
GAO recommended that Congress prohibit any further work on
the dam.75 After the Supreme Court's decision, the Endangered
Species Act was amended to allow further review of the
project's merits.76 The new review group, under prodding from
the chair of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, also
concluded that the dam was economically pointless-even the
marginal cost of finishing this almost completed project
exceeded the total benefits of the dam.77 But neither the
economic criticisms of the dam nor the environmentalists'
anguished complaints were enough to kill the project. 78 The
problem was not so much that support for the dam itself was so
strong, but that the fate of the dam was seen as tied to that of
other pork barrel projects, including a four billion dollar
boondoggle called the Tenn-Tom project. 79
Given the clash of interests and political perspectives
involved in environmental issues, it is no wonder that much of
the discussion of the issues is so unproductive. As Rena
Steinzor has said, "[Tihe views of stakeholders are polarized,
and much time is spent engaging in damaging guerilla attacks
on the other side."80 Again, the Tellico Dam is illustrative. Its
71. Id. at 351, 354.
72. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law in the Political Ecosystem-
Coping with the Reality of Politics, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 428-68 (2002).
73. 437 U.S. 153, 171-95 (1978).
74. Plater, supra note 72, at 460.
75. Id. at 460-61.
76. Id. at 462.
77. Id. at 463-64.
78. Id. at 464-67.
79. Id. at 442-45, 464-66.
80. Rena I. Steinzor, "You Just Don't Understand!"--The Right and Left
in Conversation, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,109, 11,109 (2002).
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sponsors consistently refused to engage in mediation, 81 while
the press buried the economic pointlessness of the project and
delivered a story about economic progress being defeated by a
small fish. 82
What we are left with is not a pretty picture. We face
problems with a high degree of uncertainty, but are saddled
with a public that reacts to uncertainty irrationally and with
special interest groups that are more than happy to take
advantage of the confusion. Even under ideal circumstances,
commons problems present intrinsic difficulties. How can we
possibly expect to succeed in addressing tough environmental
problems under such adverse circumstances?
II. GROUNDS FOR HOPE
These are, as promised by the title, troubled waters. But
we should not give up on our bridge construction efforts. There
is still room for hope about our possible success.
A. THE "COMEDY OF THE COMMONS"
As Carol Rose has pointed out, the tragedy of the commons
is not inevitable:
If one looks only to the conventional theory of the commons, one can
easily grow pessimistic about solving vast and multilayered ecological
problems like these. But after a generation of concern with commons
issues, we have also learned that whatever the difficulties in
principle, people in practice sometimes do manage to cope with
collective resources, so that the "inexorable" logic of the commons
does not always play out so inexorably after all. Left to their own
devices, people can figure out ways to preserve fishing grounds and
wild animal stocks; they can organize and operate collective irrigation
systems; and indeed as our own legislation suggests, they can make
some inroads on the polluted commons in air and water, even if the
successes have been costly and limited.
8 3
Last year, the National Research Council published an
extensive report about commons problems. 84  Research has
expanded in a number of directions: using game theory to
undermine the traditional economic analysis of the commons;8 5
81. Plater, supra note 72, at 435.
82. Id. at 453-54, 458, 474.
83. Carol M. Rose, Environmental Lessons, 27 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 1023,
1025 (1994) (citation omitted).
84. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS (Elinor
Ostrom et al. eds., 2002).
85. See id. at 12.
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investigating the characteristics that foster success in
controlling the commons;8 6 and exploring the utility of
alternative institutional designs.87  Some of the most
interesting research involves the effect of uncertainty on
commons problems. 88 In an intriguing paper on fisheries,
James Wilson argues that current approaches, which focus on
preserving stocks of individual species, are fundamentally
flawed because they ignore ecological interactions.89 Because of
the dynamic nature of these interactions, however, prediction is
difficult. In response to these difficulties, Wilson suggests a
three-prong approach: (1) concentration on protecting the slow-
changing elements of the ecosystem, which do not determine
specific short-term outcomes but do dictate the long-term
patterns of outcomes; (2) the use of nested governance areas so
that parallel learning about ecosystem behavior can take place;
and (3) granting fishermen broad, multispecies rights (rather
than fishing quotas limited to individual species), so as to
broaden their financial interest in ecosystem health and give
them an incentive to develop information about interactions
between species in particular regions.90 These proposals are to
some extent specific to the fisheries setting, but it is
encouraging to see progress in dealing with the effects of
uncertainty and complexity on commons management.91
Solving commons problems is most difficult at the
international level, where there is no possibility of enforcement
by an outside body.92 But despite these obstacles, some success
stories can be told. The most notable involves protection of the
86. See generally Arun Agrawal, Common Resources and Institutional
Sustainability, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra note 84, at 41 (using
extensive case studies); Shirli Kopelman et al., Factors Influencing
Cooperation in Commons Dilemmas: A Review of Experimental Psychological
Research, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra note 84, at 113.
87. See generally Carol M. Rose, Common Property, Regulatory Property,
and Environmental Protection: Comparing Community-Based Management to
Tradable Environmental Allowances, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra
note 84, at 233; see also supra note 84, at 14-15, 24-26.
88. See generally James Wilson, Scientific Uncertainty, Complex Systems,
and the Design of Common-Pool Institutions, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS,
supra note 84, at 327.
89. See id. at 327-29.
90. See id. at 340, 345-49.
91. See e.g., Tarlock, supra note 28, at 1197-1202 (providing useful
insights into how adaptive management can assist in this process).
92. For a survey of the difficulties in reaching international agreements,
see Stone, supra note 16, at 98-116.
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ozone layer. The ozone layer is a classic commons problem-it
is to everyone's advantage to preserve it, but efforts by some
nations to reduce the use of harmful chemicals achieve little if
other countries continue their production. Nevertheless,
considerable progress had been made. By the mid-1970s,
significant scientific concern existed about the effect of human
chemical production (particularly CFCs) on the ozone layer,
which is crucial to blocking ultraviolet light from the earth's
surface. 93 It took another ten years for a scientific consensus to
emerge. 94 By then, international negotiations were already far
along, with a 1985 agreement in Vienna to cooperate on
investigating the problem. 95 In 1987, a more dramatic step was
taken with the Montreal Protocol, which mandated sharp
reductions in CFC production. 96 By 1990, the agreement had
been strengthened again and a fund (eventually $240 million)
was created to assist developing countries in switching to
substitutes; by 2001, India and China had also joined the
agreement. 97 Like all success stories, this one had its unusual
circumstances (such as the cooperative attitude of the U.S.
chemical industry).98 But the achievement of international
agreement about ozone does show that success in protecting the
global commons is possible.
Global warming presents one of the most intractable
commons problems. Yet, even here there is hope, despite the
U.S. government's abandonment of international negotiations
on the subject. Other avenues of emissions reduction remain to
be explored. In his article on the psychological barriers to
addressing this issue, Rachlinski suggested that a major
program to develop alternate energy technologies would be
more likely to garner public support than an austerity
program. 99 More recently, a group of experts advocated an
intensive program to identify and develop new energy
technologies. 100 They claim that "[aIrguably, the most effective
way to reduce [carbon dioxide] emissions with economic growth
93. See CARTER, supra note 67, at 229.
94. Id. at 229.
95. Id. at 230.
96. Id. at 230-31.
97. Id. at 231-32.
98. Id. at 231.
99. Rachlinski, supra note 57, at 318-19.
100. Martin I. Hoffert et al., Advanced Technology Paths to Global Climate
Stability: Energy for a Greenhouse Planet, 298 SCIENCE 981, 986 (2002).
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and equity is to develop revolutionary changes in the
technology of energy production, distribution, storage, and
conversion." 0 1  These experts survey a batch of new
technologies, including not only improvements of existing
renewable energy uses, but also solar power satellites, nuclear
fusion, hydrogen cells, superconducting global energy grills,
and geoengineering. 10 2 Even critics of the Kyoto Protocol agree
that global warming is a serious problem and that "a
considerable increase" in research and development would be
warranted. 103
In addition, given the inherent difficulties of negotiating
such an agreement, it is surprising that Kyoto has come as
close to success as it has. Despite (or perhaps in part because
of) the U.S. withdrawal from negotiations, the other industrial
nations have moved forward to fill in the details and finalize
the agreement.104 In the meantime, European and Japanese
firms have begun to explore the potential market opportunities
created by emission reduction requirements. 10 5 This degree of
success is all the more significant since the agreement itself
has not given rise to much enthusiasm. "Indeed," Worldwatch
reports, "insider and expert opinion on Kyoto calls to mind
Winston Churchill's description of democracy as the worst
possible form of government-except for all the alternatives."'0
6
We have not yet succeeded in averting this particular "tragedy
of the commons," but we have made more progress than might
have been expected.10 7
B. LEGISLATIVE SUCCESSES AND POLITICAL PROGRESS
The pessimist's view of the legislative process suggests
that enacting significant environmental legislation should be
nearly impossible, not because of temporary circumstances but
because of the inherent nature of the political process.' 08 Yet
101. Id. at 981.
102. Id. at 982-86.
103. See BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST:
MEASURING THE REAL STATE OF THE WORLD 322-23 (2001).
104. Seth Dunn & Christopher Flavin, Moving the Climate Change Agenda
Forward, in STATE OF THE WORLD 2002, 24, 25 (Linda Starke ed., 2002).
105. Id. at 40-47.
106. Id. at 47.
107. Another stage in the story is discussed infra at note 123.
108. See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 59-61 (1992).
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the reality is quite different. We need merely consider a litany
of familiar environmental statutes:
* The Clean Air Act'0 9 has been the basis for a thirty year
national effort to reduce air pollution.
" The Clean Water Act' 10 has fostered a similar effort over
three decades to control water pollution.
" The Superfund statute111 has been the basis for a
national campaign to clean up hazardous waste sites,
while the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act1 12
regulates current waste disposal operations.
* The Endangered Species Act1 13 provides stringent
protection for endangered species.
* The Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-
Know Act requires public disclosure of toxic emissions. 14
Dispute exists over the effectiveness and design of these
statutes, but there is no doubt that they are more than token
efforts. For example, after the Clean Air Act had been in effect
for twenty-five years, the Council on Environmental Quality
reported that carbon monoxide concentrations had declined by
almost thirty percent, lead emissions were down ninety-eight
percent, and particulates were down seventy-eight percent.' 15
A more recent study reports that sulfur dioxide has fallen by
over fifty percent, and nitrogen dioxide by twenty-five percent,
despite the increase in the number of cars. 116 Even major
critics of the current regulatory system have long agreed that
the system has had some real accomplishments." 17 It is true
that these statutes are imperfect, and also true that they are
109. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
110. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
111. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
112. Id. §§ 6901-6992k.
113. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
114. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050.
115. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality: Twenty-
Fifth Anniversary Report (1996), at http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/reports/1994-
95/25thann.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2003).
116. Paul R. Portney, Air Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 77, 93 (Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins
eds., 2d ed. 2000). Portney, who has economic qualms about the Clean Air
Act's regulatory strategy, nevertheless agrees that "it seems indisputable that
the Clean Air Act and its amendments have played an important role in
improving U.S. air quality and in preventing its further degradation." Id. at
99.
117. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 76-78 (1990).
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mostly the product of a single decade of legislative ferment
from roughly 1971 to 1981. But the fact that they exist at all is
a rebuke to eco-pessimist expectations.
Although deadlock has stymied environmental legislation
at the national level, this has not been true at the state level.
For example, while some observers bemoaned the national
2002 election results as a threat to the environment, 18 some
significant victories occurred at the state level. Ballot issues
for open space or pollution control were successful across the
country, including a referendum measure in California that
authorized $1.5 billion in taxes for water quality.119 Other
successful measures included a billion dollar bond issue in
Michigan for sewage treatment, and municipal and county
initiatives totaling millions of dollars. 120 These are not isolated
incidents. States have taken the lead in mandating low-
emission vehicles, creating brownfield clean-up programs,
encouraging recycling and waste reduction, and expanding
warning requirements for toxics.121
Perhaps the most significant state initiative in recent years
is the passage in California of the first American legislation to
address global warming. On July 22, 2002, the governor signed
a bill using California's special authority over new car emission
standards to require car manufacturers to limit emissions of
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. 122 The law faces a
preemption challenge on the theory that it is an indirect effort
to set fuel efficiency standards (a field covered by another
federal statute). 23 Still, it is telling that our largest state could
muster the political will to address global warming despite the
collapse of the federal government's efforts in the area. It is
certainly not a development that any eco-pessimist would have
predicted. 24
118. See Krugman, supra note 10.
119. See Green Victories: Mandate for a Better Environment, MINNEAPOLIS
STAR TRIB., Nov. 9, 2002, at A22.
120. Id.
121. For an extensive discussion of these state programs, see Richard L.
Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis,
115 HARv. L. REV. 553, 585-630 (2001).
122. Davis Signs California Emissions Bill, Marking First U.S. Law on
Global Warming, 33 ENVTL. REP. 1637, 1637-38 (2002).
123. See Though Major Obstacles Remain, California Climate Change Law
Sets Stage for New State Air Debates, INSIDE EPA, July 26, 2002, at 1, 13.
124. For a comprehensive discussion of state-level efforts, see Barry G.
Rabe, Greenhouse & Statehouse: The Evolving State Government Role in
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Although polarization is a major problem in disputes over
environmental policy, there may also have been some progress
on this front. In the academic arena, advocates of cost-benefit
analysis have moved away from defending it on the basis of
first principles. Cost-benefit advocates now advance pragmatic
arguments on its behalf while decoupling it from the normative
framework that environmentalists have challenged. 125 For
instance, Judge Posner argues that cost-benefit analysis can
"improve the quality of governmental decision making," if only
by uncovering "bizarre anomalies" in the treatment of risks by
different agencies.' 26 Brushing aside moral critiques of cost-
benefit analysis, Posner claims that the technique needs to be
founded "on nothing deeper or more rigorous than a showing
that it has consequences that we like."' 27 These are contestable
assertions but they are subject to empirical testing.
Accordingly, the debate over cost-benefit analysis has now
begun to focus more on its institutional implementation, a topic
that lends itself to more reasoned and constructive debate than
the earlier battles over the morality of the technique. 128
There is also some hope for a less polarized political
debate, although it remains to be seen whether these hopes will
materialize. For instance, there is evidence that "tension
between Christian groups and environmentalists has loosened
drastically."129 The Republican party was badly burned after
previous efforts to curtail environmental regulation
Climate Change (2002) (Pew Center on Global Climate Change), at
http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/states-greenhouse.pdf (last visited Mar. 5,
2003).
125. Besides Judge Posner, other efforts to defend cost-benefit analysis
without embracing a reductionist normative program include Matthew D.
Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165,
168 (1999), and CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 138
(1997).
126. Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and
Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1157 (2000).
127. Id. at 1169.
128. Two important recent contributions to the new institutionalism of
cost-benefit analysis are Jason Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of
Alternative Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1343 (2002), and Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit
Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137
(2001).
129. C.M. Cameron Lynch, Environmental Awareness and -the New
Republican Party: The Re-Greening of the GOP?, 26 WM. & MARY ENV. L. &
POLY REV. 215, 228 (2001). Notably, the author of this article was a former
member of John Ashcroft's staff. See id. at 215 n.*.
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drastically. 130 Early hopes for an environmentally oriented
Bush administration 131 have not come to fruition, but we have
not yet seen the kind of aggressive attack on environmental
regulation that characterized earlier surges of Republican
power.
C. CREATIVE IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS
Given that polarization is such a major problem in
environmental law, one particularly important avenue for
progress is to defuse the conflicts by finding implementation
methods that accommodate competing concerns. Both the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the states have
sometimes used implementation as an opportunity for creative
environmental strategies. For instance, the EPA adopted an
innovative program of marketable credits when it phased out
leaded gasoline, at a net cost savings of hundreds of millions of
dollars. 32 States have also been active in experimenting with
new implementation approaches. For instance, a major
experiment in using marketable permits took place in
California. 33  The program covered almost all facilities
emitting over four tons per year of nitrogen oxides or sulfur
oxides, and by 1998 more than $42 million in trades had taken
place among the 390 facilities in the program. 34
Unfortunately, the program collapsed in the midst of
California's energy crisis in 2001. Similar systems for volatile
organic chemicals have been instituted in Illinois, New Jersey,
and Michigan. 135
A particularly interesting method of implementation
accompanied recent major revisions of the national air quality
standards. The same day that the new air quality standards
were issued, President Clinton took the unusual step of
releasing a memorandum to the EPA about implementation. 136
130. See id. at 232-34.
131. See id. at 235-37.
132. See Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental
Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 105 (2001).
133. See Daniel P. Selmi, Transforming Market Incentives from Theory to
Reality, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,695 (1994); Carolyn Whetzel, California Air
Pollution: Strategy for the Future, 28 ENVTL. REP. 2540 (1998).
134. See Selmi, supra note 133, at 10,698; Whetzel, supra note 133, at
2541.
135. See Stewart, supra note 132, at 107.
136. Implementation of Revised Air Quality Standards for Ozone and
Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,421 (Jul. 16, 1997).
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Besides discussing some of the timing problems in
implementing the new standards, the memo contains some
intriguing substantive features. It stresses regional strategies
rather than the traditional state implementation plans:
For the past two years the EPA has been working with the 37 most
eastern States through the Ozone Transport Assessment Group
(OTAG) in the belief that reducing interstate pollution will help all
areas in the OTAG region attain the NAAQS. A regional approach
can reduce compliance costs and allow many areas to avoid most
traditional no attainment planning requirements ....
If the States choose to establish a regional emission cap-and-trade
system, modeled on the current acid rain program, reductions can be
obtained at a lower cost. The EPA will encourage and assist the
States to develop and implement such a program.
37
The memo also attempts to cap compliance costs:
It was agreed that $10,000 per ton of emission reduction is the high
end of the range of reasonable costs to impose on sources ....
Market-based strategies can be used to reduce compliance costs. The
EPA will encourage the use of concepts such as a Clean Air
Investment Fund, which would allow sources facing control costs
higher than $10,000 a ton for any of these pollutants to pay a set
annual amount per ton to fund cost-effective emissions reductions
from non-traditional and small sources.' 
38
Finally, the memorandum stressed the need for research into
the health effects of fine pollutants and the possible benefits of
ground-level ozone in blocking ultraviolet rays. 139 This effort at
creative compliance by no means eliminated opposition to the
new standards. Nevertheless, it blunted the economic impact
of the new standards, enlisted state governments in the
implementation effort, and thereby helped lower the level of
conflict.
The most interesting innovations in implementation,
however, are those that not only attempt to defuse conflict but
to do so in a way that actually advances environmental goals
more effectively. Perhaps the most notable example is provided
by the Endangered Species Act (ESA). As originally enacted,
the statute was a nearly absolute bar against destruction of
individual members of endangered species. 140 But this bar led
137. Id. at 38,425.
138. Id. at 38,429.
139. Id. at 38,430. The implications of the new standards, their
implementation, and the resulting litigation, are discussed in Daniel A.
Farber, Regulatory Reform after American Trucking, 23 PACE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2003).
140. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188 (1978) (noting that federal action
endangering species must be enjoined regardless of countervailing government
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to what seemed to be an untenable situation, in which
individual landowners were faced with bans on development to
save the last few members of a species, while the government
seemed powerless to intervene at an earlier time to protect the
habitat on which the species relied.' 41  An obscure 1982
Amendment proved to be the key to the solution.' 42 The
amendment allowed the Secretary of the Interior to issue a
permit to "take" members of an endangered species (e.g., by
modifying their habitat), provided that the taking is incidental
to the project, all possible mitigation measures are used, and
there will be no appreciable effect on the prospects of the
species for survival. 43 This seemingly minor provision has
served as the basis for a sweeping new approach to protecting
endangered species.144 Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs), for
instance, have been aptly called "perhaps the most visible
example of a consensus-based, multi-stakeholder approach to
resource management."'' 45  For instance, the HCPs for
Southern California cover a 39,000-acre tract in coastal Orange
County and over 150,000 acres in the San Diego area. 146
The HCP concept was a breakthrough in two respects.
First, it provided a way of mediating the conflict between
landowners and preservationists. The statute was under
serious attack by opponents peddling "stories of outlandish
applications of the ESA-the hospital that had to move to save
a fly; the kindly old lady who lost her nest egg to save a bird.' 47
A "Republican-controlled Congress, where the statute had
become the whipping boy for property rights advocates," was
interests).
141. See generally Blaine I. Green, The Endangered Species Act and Fifth
Amendment Takings: Constitutional Limits of Species Protection, 15 YALE J.
ON REG. 329 (1998).
142. See Endangered Species Act, § 10(a)(2)(B); 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (a)(2)(B)
(2000).
143. See id.
144. See George Frampton, Ecosystem Management in the Clinton
Administration, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLY F. 39, 40 (1996) (observing that the
Clinton administration made the ESA into a "comprehensive vehicle" for
habitat planning).
145. Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. L. REV. 155, 194
(2000).
146. See William K. Stevens, Salvation at Hand for a California
Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1996, at C8.
147. J.B. Ruhl, Is the Endangered Species Act Eco-pragmatic?, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 885, 941 (2003).
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"poised to gut the statute."148 The HCP program helped defuse
the attack on the statute from landowners. Second, the statute
was also criticized by preservationists for its species-by-species
approach. HCPs provided a way to leverage the statute's
species-oriented approach into something closer to eco-system
level planning.149 As always, the HCP concept probably will
fail in application to live up to the highest aspirations of its
supporters. Nevertheless, it is a monument to the power of
human creativity to move beyond seemingly intractable
dilemmas.
It would be a mistake to conclude from the success stories
discussed above that eco-pessimism is unfounded. All of these
stories come with qualifications, and there surely have been
many defeats. If optimism is defined as a confidence that
"everything will work out for the best," we do not have a strong
basis for such a sunny outlook. What we do know, however, is
that success is possible despite the existence of serious
obstacles. Whether success will be achieved is up to us; neither
success nor failure is mandated by human nature or the logic of
human institutions.
III. THREE CHALLENGES FOR ECO-PRAGMATISM
After describing the obstacles to solving the tragedy of the
commons, Buzz Thompson recounts that a scientist friend who
is actively involved in climate change issues told him that his
essay was "overly optimistic.' ' 50 Thompson's response was that
issues like global climate change are "simply too critical not to
find effective solutions." 151  But to solve these problems,
Thompson said, "we will need to focus greater attention on how
to motivate the human imagination so that we see and care
about the risks, how to be creative in structuring new and
workable solutions, and how to overcome the inevitable fight
over who should bear the brunt of the burden.' 152  His
concluding thought was that "we will need to keep plugging
away, no matter how pessimistic we might become at some
stages of the effort."153 As I argue in Part II of this Essay,
148. Id. at 930-31.
149. See id. at 932.
150. Thompson, supra note 39, at 278.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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pessimism is unwarranted, at least in the strong form of a
sense of inevitable defeat. There are enough success stories,
large and small, to give ground for hope.
How can eco-pragmatists contribute to environmental
progress? Much of the work to be done simply involves
defending sensible policies against attack by reductionists of
one stripe or another. Lisa Heinzerling's debunking of a key
anti-regulatory myth exemplifies this kind of work. 54 In this
section, I will discuss some of the ways in which eco-
pragmatists can also play an affirmative role, moving the
pragmatic agenda forward rather than merely defending it
from attack.
A. RETHINKING DOCTRINE
As Jim Chen reminded us in his oral remarks, a good deal
of legal doctrine revolves around the concept of nexus, 155 a
concept that is in need of serious rethinking in light of the new
ecology. A quick review of some of these doctrines is useful
before we consider the impact of the new ecology. Three areas
of doctrine come immediately to mind.
First, the concept of causal nexus has become central to the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the law of standing. For
example, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 156 the Court rejected
an effort to challenge noncompliance with the ESA in federally
funded programs abroad.157 Justice Scalia found an insufficient
nexus between the threat to any of the species involved and the
individual plaintiffs in the case. 158 He scoffed at the idea that
any person who uses an ecosystem should have standing to
154. See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107
YALE L.J. 1981, 1984 (1998) (disagreeing with the contention that regulations
are often indefensibly costly). In a similar vein, see Sidney A. Shapiro &
Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based
Regulation, 1991 DuKE L.J. 729. Similarly, scholars have engaged in
important "damage control" efforts concerning some of the Court's more
zealous takings decisions. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct
"Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1411 (1993) (observing that a recent
Court decision was "more troubling than expected to those interested in
takings issues").
155. See also Daniel A. Farber, Stretching the Margins: The Geographic
Nexus in Environmental Law, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1270-75 (1996)
(addressing the "evolving geographical nexus" in recent Court cases).
156. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
157. See id. at 578.
158. See id. at 565-67 (rejecting the plaintiffs' assertion of an "ecosystem,"
"animal," and "vocational" nexus with endangered species).
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challenge a threat to one of its species without making any
specific showing of "perceptible harm." 59
Second, in delineating the boundary between state and
federal powers, the Court has been attentive to the interstate
effects of the regulated conduct. The Court now seems willing
to recognize federal jurisdiction where either the regulated
entity's conduct considered by itself has an interstate nexus or
affects the channels of interstate commerce, or the conduct is
commercial and has a cumulative interstate effect when
considered together with other similar conduct. 160 Similarly, in
considering nondiscriminatory state regulations, the Court
asks whether they have an undue impact on interstate
commerce. '61
Third, causation is often important in takings cases. It is
common for the government to require public access or
preservation covenants in return for allowing a project to
proceed. In two important decisions, the Court has held that
the government can only make this demand if the benefit
produced by the project has a "nexus" with the effects of the
project, 162 and if the covenant is in "rough proportionality" to
those effects. 163 Both decisions clearly require evidence of a
causal linkage.
If the new ecology is to be believed, however, our intuitions
about causation may lead us badly astray in applying these
doctrines. Consider in this regard the Canadian government's
effort to rescue its failing cod fishery by killing harp seals.
164
The government's reasoning was simple: Harps seals eat cod;
ergo, fewer harp seals mean more cod. 165 The Canadian
government insisted that this was a matter of common sense.1 66
But this common-sense logic overlooks that harp seals eat
many other species, which in turn affect additional species.
Consequently, the effect of eliminating half a million harp seals
per year is hard to predict:
In the face of this overwhelming complexity, it is clearly not possible
to foresee the ultimate effect of killing seals on the numbers of some
159. Id. at 566.
160. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
161. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
162. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
163. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
164. See BUCHANAN, supra note 26, at 140.
165. See id. at 141.
166. See id.
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commercial fish. With fewer seals off the Canadian coast, the number
of halibut and sculpin might grow, and since they both eat cod, there
may well end up being fewer cod than before.' 67
Moreover, computer simulations show that, while removing
some species may have little effect on the overall food web,
removing others can cause drastic changes affecting many
species. 168
We can begin to see the legal implications by imagining
that the American government had embarked on a similar
program and that a challenge had been filed by a cod
fisherman. Our first reaction (not to mention Justice Scalia's)
would undoubtedly be to say that he lacked standing. The
naive explanation would be that killing the seals could only
benefit rather than harm the cod fisherman. A more
sophisticated explanation would be that the effect of the
government's action is indeterminate, preventing him from
carrying his burden of proving injury-in-fact. But what even
the more sophisticated response overlooks is that killing the
seals introduces a major shock to the ecosystem, making it even
harder to predict or control and making it more likely that the
food web may radically shift. From the point of view of an
informed cod fisherman, then, the program provides little
expected benefit while increasing the amount of uncertainty,
which in business terms means an increased level of risk. Risk
is an economic cost; if it were not, rational actors would not pay
to mitigate it by buying insurance. Thus, contrary to
appearances, the cod fisherman has suffered a real economic
cost, but our legal system does not seem ready to recognize this
kind of injury as a basis for standing.
It seems unlikely that courts will abandon their reliance on
causation in various doctrinal contexts. Nor should they
necessarily do so, for even complex systems can sometimes be
predicted with some assurance, particularly in the short run.
Pragmatists can thus make an important contribution by
helping to reformulate doctrine to deal more appropriately with
uncertain harms.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 152-54. The classic study of the drastic consequences of
extirpating pinnipeds from a marine ecosystem is that of the Pacific sea otter.
See David 0. Duggins, Kelp Beds and Sea Otters: An Experimental Approach,
61 ECOLOGY 447 (1980).
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B. REDEFINING GOALS
In some settings, it is not difficult to imagine an ideal
outcome, such as the elimination of a potentially toxic
pollutant. Setting goals becomes more complex when we begin
to take costs into account. I have suggested that the best
understanding of our society's considered values in such
situations is something like this:
When a reasonably ascertainable risk reaches a significant level, take
all feasible steps to abate it except when costs would clearly
overwhelm any potential benefits. Meanwhile, take prudent
precautions against uncharted, but potentially serious, risks.169
This kind of formula works well when we are considering
discrete actions, such as controlling a specific pollutant or
approving a development project. But it is less useful when we
are trying to work out long-term environmental policy in a
more holistic way. Terms like "sustainability" are evocative,
but it is hard to give them concrete content.
Elucidating the concept of sustainability is no easy task.
Some of the difficulties can be seen in Richard Revesz's recent
discussion of intergenerational obligations.170 Although he is a
supporter of discounting in other contexts, he rejects its use
where future generations are concerned.'17  But Revesz also
finds the concept of sustainable development unsatisfying. 172
In a somewhat similar vein as Edith Brown Weiss's call for
recognition of a planetary trust, Revesz observes, the economist
Robert Solow has argued that each generation is obligated to
ensure that future generations' welfare does not slip below its
own.173 Revesz believes that the sustainability standard is too
narrow in scope; if we knew that future generations would be
wealthier than we are anyway, these definitions of
sustainability would leave us free to otherwise ignore their
interests. 174 Revesz is then left with a vague set of principles
169. FARBER, supra note 7, at 201.
170. See generally Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-
Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941
(1999).
171. See id. at 992-95, 998, 1000-07, 1009-14.
172. See id. at 1009-14.
173. See id. at 1011.
174. Revesz asks us to consider the hypothetical situation in which a tiny
investment like one dollar can prevent a catastrophic harm of several hundred
billion dollars in a century. With even a high discount rate, this investment
would be worth making, but it is not required by sustainability if society will
actually be wealthier than we are in a century even after allowing for the
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for intergenerational disputes: take realistic account of
opportunity costs; "prevent catastrophic harms and the
destruction of unique natural resources;" 175  attend to
distributional issues if the aggregate effect of environmental
policies leads to inequity; and attend to corrective justice-the
higher duty to correct harms for which we are responsible than
to bestow benefits on later generations. 176 These principles are
plausible but a long way from providing a usable normative
framework.
My own current view is that the argument against
intergenerational discounting has been overstated. Indeed, I
have come to believe it is inevitable and morally
unobjectionable that distant generations will figure less heavily
in our decisions than closer ones. 177 But often, this is not really
the issue because the effect of specific changes is too difficult to
estimate. Given the nature of complex dynamic systems, long-
term prediction may be fraught with irreducible uncertainties.
Instead, we often must seek some kind of healthy relationship
between humans and ecosystems. Such a relationship, we may
hope, will keep future outcomes within some kind of acceptable
bounds, while also satisfying our moral and aesthetic needs
toward nature.
In trying to define the desirable end-states, Amy
Wildermuth has looked to the writings of Aldo Leopold and his
concept of land health. 78 Drawing on a different strand of
ecological thought, Dan Tarlock calls for a "simulated
naturalness" in ecosystem revival projects. 179 Whatever the
ultimate verdict may be on these specific proposals, eco-
pragmatists clearly do need some affirmative vision of what the
world should look like, considering the needs of humans as well
as the rest of the biosphere. The term "sustainable
development" might be the perfect answer, if only we knew
what it meant!
We may find some guidance in Wilson's suggestion that
catastrophic harm. See id. at 1013-14.
175. Id. at 1015.
176. See id. at 1015-16.
177. See Daniel A. Farber, From Here to Eternity: Environmental
Regulation and Future Generations, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
178. See Amy J. Wildermuth, Eco-pragmatism and Ecology: What's Leopold
Got to Do with It?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1145, 1153 (2003).
179. Tarlock, supra note 28, at 1191. The term "simulated" may itself be
misleading, if it is taken to imply that the ecosystem has ever been pristinely
"natural" and free from human influence and shaping.
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adaptive managers focus on the slow-changing variables in the
ecosystem. 180  These slow-changing elements provide the
structure, which in turn generates familiar patterns of
outcomes. This analysis suggests a focus on keeping crucial
parameters such as atmospheric carbon dioxide within their
historic ranges. It might also suggest, for ecosystems in which
human agriculture is substantial, that we keep a close eye on
soil condition-thereby taking Leopold's interest in "land"
health quite literally.
C. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Despite its successes, there is a widespread belief that the
current regulatory system needs a major overhaul.18' Although
space precludes a full analysis of the competing proposals, a
couple of examples may be instructive. For instance, Don
Elliott suggests the possibility of replacing "command and
control" with "command and covenant." 8 2  Under this
approach, the government still sets minimum acceptable levels
of environmental quality. Rather than dictate the method of
reaching those levels, however, "implementing agencies
(whether states, local districts, or individual factories) are
empowered to design their own enforceable alternative
compliance methods or covenants, provided that they
demonstrate that the alternative achieves equivalent or better
environmental performance." 183 According to Elliott, "[t]his
approach essentially allows private parties to 'contract around'
inefficient government regulations by substituting a more
efficient alternative for achieving an equivalent level of
environmental performance." 184
Brad Karkkainnen observes that moves away from
regulatory formality necessarily expand agency discretion and
thereby raise concerns about the potential for unprincipled or
arbitrary outcomes. 8 5  He suggests, however, that one
180. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
181. For further discussion and a survey of proposed new approaches, see
Daniel A. Farber, Triangulating the Future of Reinvention: Three Emerging
Models of Environmental Protection, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 61.
182. E. Donald Elliott, Toward Ecological Law and Policy, in THINKING
ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, 183-84
(Marian Chertow and Daniel Esty eds. 1997).
183. Id. at 183-84.
184. Id.
185. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and
Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L.
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important category of rules, those imposing regulatory penalty
defaults, are consistent with adaptive management. 186 Like
their namesakes in contract law, these regulatory defaults use
the threat of sanctions as an information-forcing mechanism.1 87
One difficulty in the regulatory situation, however, is that the
government both sets the default rules and is one of the
negotiating parties, raising a potential conflict of interest.188
Karkkainen borrows from regulatory takings law to establish
standards to control potential abuses. 189
These proposals and others will need serious examination
and testing before they can be fully accepted. Arranging for
flexible, experimental management without sacrificing
accountability is a tall order. Understandably, "[c]ritics view
the embrace of negotiation.., as, at best, a romantic and
misguided enterprise, and at worst a naked power grab by well-
financed repeat players."1 90 Improving on existing governance
structures, so as to combine adaptive management and
democratic control, is one of the major challenges facing
pragmatic ecologists today. Nevertheless, progress toward a
solution does seem to be slowly taking place.
We can expect progress on these issues of institutional
design to be slow and to involve a good deal of trial and error.
Key innovations like HCPs tend to come from those who are
intimately involved with concrete problems-field workers
rather than theoreticians. Scholars, however, also will play an
important role in figuring out how to generalize from the
specific stories of success and failure.
CONCLUSION
We began in Part I by considering some of the reasons why
environmental protection is so difficult to accomplish. One
reason is that we always seem to operate in a state of scientific
uncertainty. This uncertainty not only causes problems
directly, but also interacts with human psychology to foster
denial and avoidance. Other psychological problems also
abound, relating to an inability to process probabilities, bias in
REV. 943, 943-44 (2003).
186. See id. at 944.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 983.
189. See id. at 984-89.
190. Freeman, supra note 145, at 201.
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favor of the status quo, and selective absorption of information.
These problems of individual psychology are compounded by
the political difficulties: collective action problems; the
influence of special interests; and a level of polarization that
makes constructive debate difficult.
If the case for pessimism seems worrisome, it should. The
next generation of environmental protection will have to
overcome some deep-seated features of human psychology and
social structure, a daunting prospect. The best reason not to
despair is simply that on occasion we have somehow managed
to overcome these barriers. Despite all of these difficulties, we
saw in Part II that major environmental statutes have been
enacted, and problems of the commons have sometimes been
solved even in the international arena. What has been done
once can be done again. But as discussed in Part III, difficult
challenges remain, not only in terms of political resistance to
sensible environmental policies but also in defining those
policies, reconciling them with current law, and finding new
ways of implementing them.
As against the formidable barriers to success, we have only
two major resources. One is the widespread, if sometimes
inchoate, recognition around the world of the environment's
importance. The other is a form of human capital-the
intelligence and creativity of scientists, lawyers, social
scientists, activists, and policy makers which has gotten us this
far. With a little luck, those resources will be enough to see us
through.
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